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Abstract
We compare the e¤ects of migration on the production of public goods, income taxes, and on the
welfare of residents in the sending and in the receiving country. Migration is driven by income
di¤erences between countries. Alternative wage adjustment scenarios are considered: fully
exible wages; upward rigidity, and unemployment. We show that in all scenarios, emigration
is welfare detrimental for the origin country. Migration is welfare improving for the destination
country in presence of exible wages and upward rigidity, but it has detrimental e¤ects in
presence of unemployment.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we compare the e¤ects of migration on the production of public goods, income
taxes, and on the welfare of residents in the sending and in the receiving country. We proceed
in a simple standard model by comparing the welfare levels reached before and after migration
in each country.
When economic circumstances are favorable, rich countries are fond of receiving migrants
coming from the poor regions. By contrast, under recession, when even in prosperous areas
unemployment is present, rich countries seem to be reluctant to welcome migrants, in particular
because they occupy vacancies no longer available for their own residents. On the one hand,
such population movements impact the economic welfare of residents in both countries but this
impact varies according to the economic circumstances characterizing the economic activity.
Among these characteristics, one plays a crucial role: the gross wage rate, and how it reacts
to the pressure coming from the excess supply (resp. demand) that migration generates on
the labor market. The gross wage rate also depends on technological productivity and on the
existence of rigidities on the labor market. On the other hand, the net wage rate depends on
the level of income taxes levied to nance public goods. Thus, migration a¤ects the level of
public goods supplied in the destination and the origin country and, consequently, the income
taxes that have to be levied to nance the production of public goods.
The basic ingredients we have just evoked constitute the building blocks of the model in
which we analyze the impact of migration on residentswelfare in the destination and the
origin countries. As stressed above, the economic environment matters in this analysis. How
the income tax is selected by the governments and how the wage rate is determined generate
several di¤erent scenarios. We assume that the income tax in each country is selected by the
Government in order to maximize the residentswelfare via the production of a public good
nanced by the tax proceeds. As for the labor market, we analyse several alternative scenarios.
In the rst one, it is assumed that the gross wage adjusts in each country instantaneously at
its equilibrium value. In the destination country, a larger labor force is now available due to
migration, so that, with a wage rate at equilibrium before migration, instantaneous adjustment
entails a smaller wage rate ex-post migration. On the contrary, in the origin country, less
workers are now available, and the wage rate has to increase under instantaneous adjustment.
In the second scenario, we assume that the wage rate does not adapt instantaneously but
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remains rigid. Two subcases must immediately be distinguished in this scenario. If at the
ex-ante wage in the destination country there exists some unlled vacancies, these vacancies
can then be lled in with migrants arriving from the origin country. On the contrary, when
unemployment exists, the arrival of migrants necessarily deteriorates labor market conditions.
Then we assume that this migration creates a pressure to substitute some migrants to natives
in their existing jobs, so that the pool of jobless people now includes both some natives having
lost their job and some migrants. To each of these scenarios corresponds a di¤erent impact
of migration on the welfare of residents and it is precisely this impact that we analyze in the
following sections.
In this analysis, we assume that preferences of the agents over the private and public good
are represented by a quadratic utility function. We obtain some precise answers to our initial
question under this assumption. We examine when migration improves or alternatively deteri-
orates the welfare of the residents both in the origin and destination countries under the three
alternative scenarios: instantaneous wage adjustment after migration, upward and downward
wage rigidity.
Our ndings are as follows. In the rst scenario, when the wage rate adjusts instantaneously
to its new equilibrium value after migration, we show that migration is welfare improving in the
destination country. Migration generates at the ex-post equilibrium an increase in the public
good produced and, accordingly, an increase in the income tax needed to nance this extra
public good production. Furthermore, due to the labor market exibility assumption, the ow
of migrants yields a decrease in per capita income. These combined e¤ects reect however an
overall positive impact on nativeswelfare level. As for the origin country, the e¤ect on the
residentswelfare turns out to be the reverse of that observed in the destination country: the
impact is always welfare detrimental.
The second scenario corresponds to the situation when the wage does not adjust instanta-
neously to its equilibrium value. Under this hypothesis, we must distinguish whether, before
migration, there are, or there are not, some unlled vacancies at the xed existing wage rate.
In the rst case, arriving migrants can ll in these vacancies in the destination country. We
show that, as a result, immigration is always benecial for natives in the destination country.
This solution corresponds to intuition. With existing vacancies still not yet lled in the labor
market of the destination country, migration from abroad due to income di¤erences between the
two countries increases the home production of the public good while it provides a higher net
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income to the migrants. The result is again negative for the origin country: assuming upward
rigidity of wages, emigration lowers the level of welfare of natives in the origin country.
Going on with the third scenario, we assume that, before and after migration, unemployment
exist both in the origin and in the destination country. After migration has taken place, those
who work are randomly selected among the natives and the migrants in the new pool of the
labor force. We also assume that an unemployment benet is provided to those who do not
nd a job. Then, we prove that under downward rigidity of the wage rate, immigration has
negative e¤ects on welfare of natives in the destination country as well as in the origin country.
Thus, in a nutshell, emigrations are always detrimental for the origin country, while they
are often welfare improving for the destination country, unless this last su¤ers from unemploy-
ment. Notice however that this conclusion relies on specic linear quadratic preferences of the
population over the private and public good. The latter assumption while making our analysis
particular, allows us to stress the major elements prone to determine the impact of migrations
on welfare in a general context.
The model is dened in section 2. Flexible wages are considered in section 3. Rigid wages
are analyzed in section 4 with two subsections, downward and upward rigidity. Section 5 details
the existing literature. Finally a short conclusion closes the paper.
2 The model
We consider a stylized model to describe the basic insights of the e¤ects of migratory ows on
the welfare of the residents of the origin and destination country. Assume two countries, H and
F each imposing income taxes ti i = H;F on their residents with the aim of using tax proceeds
to supply local public goods Yi; i = H;F . Individuals are free to choose where to live.
Population in each country is distributed over types and the set of types is represented
in each country by the [0; 1] interval. Heterogeneity of population captures heterogeneity on
the cost of migrating x; x 2 [0; 1] : The higher x; the higher the cost of living abroad. The
reasons why the cost of moving abroad is not the same across the population of residents are
many. Some of them are strongly attached to their relatives living in their residential area,
while others are considerably more mobile, simply because they have weaker links with people
living around them (see Beine et al (2011) for the role of diasporas on migration). National
traditions, patriotism, and historical origins constitute signicant values for some individuals,
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while they let others, -who feel like citizens of the World-, almost indi¤erent.
The utility of an individual who is a native of country i and who lives in country i; i = H;F
is given by
Ui = (2  Yi)Yi + wi(1  ti); i = H;F :
The rst component of the function Ui captures the utility derived by the consumption of the
public good with Yi  1. The second component of the above utility function is the amount
of private good consumed when the price of this good is normalized to one. Each agent owns
exactly one unit of labor L that he/she splits eventually between the production of the public
good and that of the private good. Let the technology in each country be 2ki
p
L with ki > 0;
i = H;F; and kH > kF : For simplicity, assume kH = 1: The variable wi denotes the real wage
obtained in exchange of participating in production of the private good. Thus we assume that
there exists a technology gap between the two countries: the marginal product of labor is larger
in country H than in country F . Only if the labor market is competitive, the equilibrium level
wi of the real wage equals the marginal product of labor. Nonetheless, we assume that the
wage wi can be xed at any level and entailing either unemployment in case of excess labor
supply, or free vacancies in case of excess labor demand. Since taxes are levied with the aim of
nancing the public good, the budget constraint of each government is given by
Yi = tiw
0
i ; i = H;F (1)
where the superscript 0 refers to the no migration solution. Then, using (1) ; we have
t0i =
Yi
w0i
; i = H;F:
In order to decide the amount of public good to be produced, the government in country i
maximises the level of utility of its residents under the budget constraint, namely:
MaxYi (2  Yi)Yi + w0i (1  ti)
s.t. t0i =
Yi
w0i
:
The objective function is concave; so using the rst order condition, we obtain
 
Y 0i

=
1
2
 
t0i

=
1
2w0i
i = H;F: (2)
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The tax rate should satisfy 0 < ti < 1; then 0 <
1
2w0i
< 1 implying that w0i >
1
2
; i = 1; 2:
Consequently, the level of utility (U0i )
 corresponding to the choice of taxes and public good
level is given by
 
U0i

= w0i +
1
4
; i = H;F: (3)
It follows that the level of utility of an individual living in country H is strictly higher than the
level of utility of an individual living in country F; if and only if w0H > w
0
F : This di¤erence in
wages incites some individuals in country F to leave their country and migrate towards country
H to take advantage of the higher level of utility in this country. It is easy to see that this set
of migrants is exactly given by the interval [0; x] where x is dened by1
x = w0H   w0F :
The ow of migrants should not exceed one by construction, so it must hold that w0H w0F < 1:
All individuals at the left of x on the unit interval have a cost of migration that is inferior
to w0H   w0F ; and thus they will migrate from F to H: It follows that, after the migration,
the number of individuals whose type belong to the interval [0; x] ; who live in H; is now
doubled. Both governments anticipate this migratory ow. Hence, country H anticipates that
its population after migration will be8<: 2 over the interval [0; w0H   w0F ]1 over the interval [0; 1] ; :
with w0H on the interval [0; 1] and w
0
F on the interval [0; w
0
H   w0F ] :
The e¤ects of migration on the production of the public good in the destination country
and corresponding taxes, and accordingly on the resulting welfare of natives, depends crucially
on the mechanism of wage adjustment in the labor market, depending whether there is excess
labor demand or excess labor supply after migration has taken place.
In the following sections we analyze two scenarios. In the rst, we assume à la HarrisTodaro
(1970) that the wage after migration adjusts to the new labor supply in both countries, so that
full employment is reached before and after migration. In the second scenario, we assume
1Assimilating the set of migrants to this interval implicitly assumes that migration is only motivated by
di¤erences in gross wages, which does not take into account that migrants could also anticipate the level of
future real income taxes, serving in the production of the public good.
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wage rigidity. Downward rigidity implies that the ow of migrants creates unemployment in
the destination country. On the contrary, upward rigidity generates an excess demand for
labor, implying that migration reduces the number of vacancies in the destination country.
Corresponding to each of these scenarios we ask the question: who wins and who loses from
migration?
3 Flexible wages
In this section, we assume that wages always instantaneously adjust in each country in order to
clear the labor market. Consequently, the equilibrium wage in country H (resp. F) corresponds
initially to the competitive wage, namely w0H  wH = 1 (resp. w0F = wF = kF ): w0H > w0F :
These wages now adapt to the new labor market conditions after migration.
Let us rst consider the destination country H: The new labor supply in country H is
1+x  1+(w0H w0F ) = 2 kF ; and the corresponding level of wage at the new full employment
equilibrium after migration, in country H is w1H = 1=
p
2  kF . Similarly, the new labor supply
in country F is 1   x  1   (w0H   w0F ) = kF ; and the wage level at the full employment
equilibrium is now w1F =
p
kF :
The government in country H decides the level of public good in accordance with the new
level of wage w1H on which the income tax will be levied. The new budget constraint writes as
YH  tHw1H + tH(w0H   w0F )w1H :
Solving the above for the tax rate we nd:
t^1H =
YH
w1H (1 + (w
0
H   w0F ))
:
Then the problem solved by the government in country H is
MaxYH (2  YH)YH + w1H (1  tH)
s.t. t1H =
YH
w1H (1 + (w
0
H   w0F ))
:
Using the rst order condition and substituting w0H = 1,w
0
F = kF ; w
1
H = 1=
p
2  kF , we obtain
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Y^ 1H =
3  2kF
4  2kF (4)
and the corresponding tax is then
t^1H =
Y^ 1H
w1H (1 + (1  kF ))
: (5)
Hence, we claim the following proposition.
Lemma 1 Assuming exible wages, migration leads to an increase in the public good and taxes
in the destination country.
Proof. Directly comparing (4) and (5) with (2) :
The comparison of the level of utility with and without migration under exible wages is
ambiguous. Directly comparing the level of utility of the residents of country H before and
after migration yields the following result.
Proposition 1 Assuming exible wages, free immigration is welfare improving for residents
in the destination country.
Proof. To prove the proposition, we take the di¤erence of the utility functions (3) with
the level of utility after migration, namely w0H +
1
4
 
h
(2  Y^ 1H)Y^ 1H + w1H (1  t^1H)
i
; evaluated
at the optimal taxes and public goods corresponding to the before and after migration scenar-
ios. If this di¤erence is negative, then the level of utility before migration is lower then the
utility after migration. Substituting the expressions of Y^ 1H and t^
1
H ; the di¤erence is given by
1
4
11 8kF 4(2 kF )
p
2 kF+k2F
(2 kF )2 : Then, the sign of the di¤erence in utility before and after migration
is determined by the sign of the denominator D  11   8kF   4 (2  kF )
p
2  kF + k2F : The
expression D admits two solutions in kF , one solution is negative and the other solution is equal
to 1. The sign of D is clearly negative for any admissible value of kF ; namely for kF 2 (0; 1) :
The intuition behind this result is as follows. According to Lemma 1, in country H migration
entails an increase in the public good but due to labor market exibility the ow of migrants
yields also a decrease in wages. These combined e¤ects would reect a negative (resp. positive)
impact on nativeswelfare level if and only if the income share dedicated to public good is smaller
(resp. larger) than that dedicated to the private good. In our framework, migration positivity
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impacts nativeswelfare because the increase in public good level more than compensates for
the decrease in private income.
Origin country. Following the same procedure as for the destination country, we identify
the optimal solution for the public good level and the resulting income tax before migration,
namely Y^ 0F =
1
2
and t^0F =
1
2kF
and after migration, i.e., Y^ 1F =
2kF 1
2kF
and t^1F =
1
2
2kF 1
(
p
kF )
5 : A direct
comparison of these amounts reveals that emigration decreases the level of public good provided
as well as the tax paid by the citizens left behind in country F: Taking the di¤erence between
the level of welfare after and before migration, we obtain
Proposition 2 Assuming exible wages, emigration is always welfare detrimental for residents
in the origin country.
Proof. The sign of di¤erence in welfare after and before migration is given by the sign of
 

kF + 2k
3
2
F   1

; which is negative for kF > 1=2 which is assumed to hold for the positivity
of taxes.
In the case of the origin country, migration entails a decrease in the public good level and
taxes, whereas the wage rate increases from kF to
p
kF (where kF > 1=2). The overall e¤ect
of the residentswelfare of the origin country depends upon the balance of these e¤ects. The
loss in utility resulting from the decrease in public good dominates the benet resulting from
the wage increase. Hence, comparing Propositions 1 and 2, we observe that migration is never
a "win-win" game.
Now that we have fully elucidated the e¤ects of migration under a exible wage regime, we
move to the analysis of migration when wages are rigid. As we explained earlier, two possible
regimes can be envisaged at any pre-existing wage level w0i ; i = H;F . In the rst, upward
wage rigidity at the level w0H generates free vacancies ex ante migration. In the second regime,
downward rigidity at the level w0H generates unemployment. We start with the rst regime.
4 Rigid Wages
4.1 Excess demand of labor
Assuming upward wage rigidity at the level of w0H , the budget constraint of country H after
migration becomes
YH  tHw0H + tH(w0H   w0F )w0H :
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Hence, the government receives a tax receipt from the native population equal to tHw0H and,
in addition, a tax receipt equal to tH(w0H   w0F )w0H from the migrants whose ow is precisely
w0H   w0F : Solving the above for the tax rate we nd:
t1H =
YH
w0H + (w
0
H   w0F )w0H
:
where the superscript 1 indicates the period after migration has taken place.2
The objective function of the government of country H is the utility of its residents before
migration takes place3. The problem of the government in H writes as :
max
YH
(2  YH)YH + w0H(1  t1H)
s.t. t1H 
YH
w0H + (w
0
H   w0F )w0H
:
Using the rst order condition we obtain:
 
Y 1H

=
1
2
1 + 2 (w0H   w0F )
1 + w0H   w0F
> 0 (6)
The corresponding level of taxes in country H is given by
 
t1H

=
1
2
1 + 2 (w0H   w0F )
w0H (1 + w
0
H   w0F )2
> 0:4 (7)
Then, directly comparing the equilibrium levels of the public good and taxes before and after
migration, we conclude that
Lemma 2 Migration increases both the level of public good and the level of taxes in the desti-
nation country.
Proof. Directly comparing (6) and (7) with (2) :
Thus, this proposition does not allow us to conclude whether migration is welfare detrimental
or improving in the destination country, since migration increases the level of public good but
2Notice that in this section, we assume that the ow of migrants w0H   w0F does not exceed the number
of vacancies in the destination country. If that would be the case, then we would fall into the unemployment
scenario that is analysed in Section 5.2.
3This assumption could be justied for instance by supposing that the existing government must be reelected
and that the future voters in the election consist only of the native residents.
4Notice that keeping our assumption wH > 1=2 (assumed for positivity of taxes in Section 1); guaranties
that t1H does not exceed 1.
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increases the tax as well. To clarify this ambiguity, we compare the level (U0H)
 and (U1H)
 of
the utilities obtained by natives before and after migration. This di¤erence writes as 
U0H
    U1H = 14  3  w0H   w0F + 2 w0F   w0H(w0F   w0H   1)2 ;
which is clearly negative due to w0F   w0H < 0: Hence, we claim the following
Proposition 3 Assuming upward wage rigidity, immigration is always benecial for natives of
the destination country.
Under upward wage rigidity, the destination country is fond of welcoming migrants because
it allows to ll available vacancies. It is not surprising that the increase in the production of
public good leads to an increase in welfare, given that the tax does not change and the level of
income remains the same as before migration.
Origin country. Similarly, to the above analysis, we can identify the optimal choice of the
government in F as follows (Y 1F )

= 1
2
2w0F 2w0H+3
w0F w0H+2
and (t1F )

= 1
2
2w0F 2w0H+3
w0F (w0F w0H+2)
2 . As before, it is
unclear whether emigration generates a decrease or an increase in the welfare of the residents
of the origin country, being the level of public good and taxes higher after migration. To clarify
this ambiguity we make the direct comparison between the level of the utility ex-ante and
ex-post migration. It turns out that
Proposition 4 Emigration is always welfare detrimental for the residents in the origin country.
Proof. Directly comparing the level of utility for the residents in the origin country before
and after migration we obtain 1
4
(1  (w0H   w0F ))
3(w0H w0F ) 5
(wF wH+2)2 which is clearly negative for w
0
H
  w0F < 1: This is always satised being w0H   w0F (the ow of migrants) strictly smaller than
one by construction.
4.2 Unemployment: downward rigidity of wages
In this section, we assume that due to downward wage rigidities in the labor market, wages do
not adjust to clear the labor market neither before nor after migration yielding unemployment
before and after migration.5 We examine this situation by revisiting the benchmark setting of
5This rigidity can be due to a bargaining between the government and the trade unions in the country of
destination that takes place before migration, as in Fuest and Thum (2000).
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country i = H;F before migration in presence of unemployment. As in Section 2, since taxes
are levied with the aim of nancing the public good, the budget line of each government is
given by
Yi = tiw
0
i (1  u0i ); i = H;F (8)
where the superscript 0 refers to the initial period when no migration has taken place and u0i is
the unemployment rate, before migration, in each country. Analysing the labor market in each
country, the level of unemployment at the rigid wage w0H and w
0
F is equal to uH = 1   1(w0H)2
and uF = 1  ( kFw0F )
2:
Using the expression of the budget line, we have
t0i =
Yi
w0i (1  u0i )
; i = H;F:
We assume that the unemployed workers receive an unemployment benet b exogenously de-
ned and the same in each country. Then, in order to decide the amount of public good to
be produced, the government in country i maximises the level of utility of its employed and
unemployed residents, EUi; under the budget constraint, namely:
max
Yi
EUi = (1  u0i )
 
(2  Yi)Yi + w0i (1  ti)

+ u0i ((2  Yi)Yi + b)
s.t. t0i =
Yi
w0i (1  u0i )
:
The objective function is concave so that we use the rst order condition and obtain
 
Y 0i

=
1
2
and
 
t0i

=
1
2w0i (1  u0i )
i = H;F: (9)
If there is no unemployment, u0i = 0, then the optimal level of public goods and taxes coincide
with the corresponding levels of the benchmark setting in Section 2. For tractability, we assume
that u0H = u
0
F = u:
6 Then, the level of expected utility EUi evaluated at the optimal choices is
given by
(EUi)
 = w0i (1  u) + bu+
1
4
; i = H;F (10)
6This simplifying assumption imposes conditions on kF but this is not an issue when wages rigid.
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For later use, we also calculate the utility (U0i )
 for the employed citizens and (UN0i )
 for the
unemployed ones in country i, once uncertainty in the labor market is revealed. We obtain 
U0i

=
3
4
+ w0i  
1
2(1  u) ; i = H;F: (11) 
UN0i

=
3
4
+ b; i = H;F:
After migration, we assume that some random mechanism selects those among the population
of native and migrants who will be employed or unemployed.7 Thus, the employed workers in
country H after migration are natives who were not red as well as migrants who were hired.
Furthermore, we assume that the unemployed workers of mass x receive an unemployment
benet b exogenously dened, with w0F   12(1 u)  b and w0F < w0H . Consequently u is on the
left of x where x is dened as w0H   w0F . Then, the set of migrants is exactly given by the
interval [0; x] with x dened by
x = w0H   w0F :
The budget constraint of country H after migration is then given by
YH  tHw0H(1  uH)  b
 
w0H   w0F
  buH :
Solving the above for the tax rate we nd
t1H =
YH
w0H(1  uH)
+ b
w0H   w0F + uH
w0H(1  uH)
:
where the superscript 1 indicates that migration has taken place.
The unemployment rate in countryH is given by x+u
1+x
: Then, a portion of 1 u
1+x
native residents
is employed after migration has taken place. Accordingly, the preferences of a resident in country
H now appears as an expected utility with probabilities to be employed or unemployed. Thus,
the problem faced by the government in country H is then
max
YH
1 uH
1+w0H w0F
((2  YH)YH + w0H(1  t1H)) + uH+w
0
H w0F
1+w0H w0F
((2  YH)YH + b) (12)
s.t. t1H =
YH
w0H(1 uH)
+ b
w0H w0F+uH
w0H(1 uH)
(13)
The solution of the above problem yields the optimal choice of public good level Y 1H as follows
7This assumption was introduced by Schmidt et al. (1994).
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 
Y 1H

=
1
2
1 + 2 (w0H   w0F )
1 + w0H   w0F
(14)
and the corresponding level of taxes (t1H)
 obtains as
 
t1H

=
(Y 1H)

w0H(1  u)
+ b
w0H   w0F + u
w0H(1  u)
(15)
which is admissible smaller than one if and only if u < 1  1
2
1+2w0H 2w0F
w0H(1+w0H w0F )
. It is interesting to
notice that a welfare maximizing government selects an optimal level of public good (Y 1H)
 that
does not depend on the level of unemployment u. By contrast, the decision of optimal taxes
on private income involves the rate of unemployment: the higher u; the higher the income tax.
Hence, in our setting, a benevolent government decides the level of public good by taking into
account only the tax base (the number of agents located in the country). It levies taxes on
private income to sustain the public budget needed to cover the total amount of unemployment
benets as well as the public good provision.
By direct comparison of optimal choices of public levels and taxes before and after migration
we observe that
Lemma 3 Migration increases both the level of public good and the level of taxes in the desti-
nation country.
Proof. Directly comparing (14) and (15) with (9) :
Given Lemma (3), what are the welfare e¤ects of migration in the destination country?
In presence of unemployment migration e¤ects proliferate. First, the public budget covering
unemployment benets increases with the arrival of migrations: a higher number of agents
will demand the unemployment benet (the pool of unemployed workers passes from u to
u + x ). Hence, in this scenario, migration increases the public expenditure via two channels:
higher total amount of unemployment paid and higher level of public good provided. Such
a budget increase can only be sustained through a higher tax on private income in the post-
migration period. By contrast, in the scenarios in Sections 3 and 4.1 where unemployment
was absent, migration increases the public spending in public goods and larger tax revenues in
post-migration period, are entirely dedicated to the increase in public good provided to natives
of the destination country. For this reason, in the exible wage scenario as well as in the upward
wage rigidity scenario, the arrival of migrants is welfare improving. Whereas with downward
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wage rigidity, immigration may cause larger negative e¤ects on the working natives because
the increase in the post-migration tax revenue is not entirely devoted to a higher public good
but also to a higher bill on unemployment benets. Hence, the increase in public good level
may be insu¢ cient to compensate for the increase in taxes, leading to detrimental e¤ects for
the working natives.
Second, migration increases the chance to become unemployed for the native population who
was working before migration. Consequently, there are natives that will certainly move from
working to being unemployed. The unemployed natives before migration will have it harder to
nd a job with a higher rate of unemployment. Nonetheless, an unemployed native surprisingly
may see his level of utility increase with migration if in the ex-post migration scenario they
remain unemployed. In fact, for this category of agents, migration increases the level of public
good provided, without decreasing the level of unemployment benet b:
To investigate the overall welfare e¤ect of migration on natives, we rst compare the ex-
pected utility before and after migrantsarrival. We nd the following results:
Proposition 5 Under downward rigidity, immigration is welfare detrimental for natives of the
destination country.
Proof. The di¤erence of expected utilities before and after migration is positive (implying
welfare detrimental e¤ects) if the following inequality is satised
4
  w0F + w0H + 1
0@ (w0H   w0F + 1) b+
+

w0Fw
0
H   (w0H)2

1Au >  
0@  3w0F   w0H   4 (w0H)2+
+4w0Fw
0
H + 2
1A w0F   w0H :
Notice rst that the RHS of the inequality is always negative for w0H   w0F and w0F > 1=2:
Hence, if the LHS is positive the above inequality is always true. The LHS is positive, i.e.
(w0H   w0F + 1) b +

w0Fw
0
H   (w0H)2

> 0 i¤ b > w0H
w0F w0H
w0F w0H 1
: Then for b > w0H
w0H w0F
1+w0H w0F
;
migration is welfare detrimental. By contrast, if the LHS is negative i.e. b < b0, then, migration
is welfare detrimental if u < u0   

 3w0F w0H 4(w0H)
2
+4w0Fw
0
H+2

(w0F w0H)
4( w0F+w0H+1)

b bw0F+bw0H (w0H)
2
+w0Fw
0
H
 and welfare benecial
if u > u0: Nonetheless, as we saw, equilibrium taxes require u < 1   1
2
1+2w0H 2w0F
w0H(1+w0H w0F )
, which is
a more restrictive condition than u < u0 as long as b < b0. Hence, migration is never welfare
improving because u cannot lie in the interval u > u0 with b < b0:
To understand the intuition behind the Proposition we shall consider the fact that migration
a¤ects di¤erently the utility of a native who works and a native who is unemployed. The
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workers bear higher taxes and benet a higher public good after migration. The unemployed
workers only benet higher public good. But the weight of workers and unemployed ones in the
objective function of the government (12) depends on the rate of unemployment u. Therefore,
the overall impact of immigration on the expected utility depends on how much b and u a¤ects
the increase in taxes (detrimental for natives who work) and the corresponding increase in
public goods (benecial for everyone) taking into account the allocation of these e¤ects among
natives who work and those who dont, which in turn depends on the level of u:
Migration is welfare detrimental when b is large regardless of the level of u; because very
large unemployments benets direct lots of resources away from the provision of public goods.
Migration is welfare detrimental also when b is not very large and u is not large. In fact,
the unemployment rate in our setting a¤ects negatively the opportunity cost of being unem-
ployed. The unemployment rate a¤ects negatively the level of utility of a working native before
migration (see equation 11). The higher the level of unemployment, the higher the total unem-
ployment benets to be paid, the smaller the net wage of a worker who bears the cost of the
unemployment benets. Hence, the higher the unemployment rate, the smaller the di¤erence in
utility levels between a working and an unemployed native.8 Furthermore, the unemployment
rate a¤ects positively the level of taxes after migration (see 15). Therefore u further reduces the
opportunity cost of being unemployed after migration. As long as the weight of the unemployed
workers in the objective function in (12) is not very big even when the unemployment benet
is not big, migration remains always welfare detrimental.
Origin Country. We turn now the attention to the origin country F. For this country, the
budget constraint after emigration is
YF  tFw0F (1  u)  b
 
u   w0H   w0F  :
Country F pays the unemployment benet to a smaller pool of unemployed: u   (w0H   w0F ) :
Following the same analysis as for country H; we nd that the optimal level of public goods as
well as optimal taxes as follows:
Y 1

F =
1
2
and t1

F =
1
2
1 + 2bu  2b (w0H   w0F )
w0F (1  u)
8This is so as long as the unemploymanet benet does not change with the unemployment rate, which is the
assumption we make in this paper.
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In the origin country, immigration leaves the public good level unchanged but it increases taxes,
in fact t0

F   t1F = b u+w
0
H w0F
w0F (1 u)
which is negative being u > w0H  w0F by construction. The level
of expected utility after emigration is w0F (1  u)+ b (w0H   w0F )+ 14 : By direct comparison with
the expression of the expected utility before emigration (10), we nd
Proposition 6 Assuming downward rigidity of wages, emigration is welfare detrimental for
the natives of the origin country.
It is worth to point out that emigration is always welfare detrimental for the origin country,
regardless the scenario on the labor market. Existing literature has shown many detrimen-
tal e¤ects of emigration on origin country as for instance the brain drain (see Docquier and
Rapoport, 2012, for a survey). We are the rst to show that this is also the case in a very
simple model of public nance with homogeneous workers. As far as it concerns the destina-
tion country, immigration is very often welfare improving. The only scenario in which it has
detrimental e¤ects is with unemployment.
To summarize our results, the following table represents the e¤ects of migrations on welfare
in both the destination and the origin countries for the di¤erent labor market regimes.
Destination country Origin Country
Flexible Wages +  
Upward Rigidity +  
Unemployment    
5 Relation to existing literature
Our approach is devoted to the welfare e¤ects of migration, depending on the labor market
rigidities and the governmentschoice of the level of public good. By contrast, the existing lit-
erature examines the welfare e¤ects of migration as a consequence of (i) the type of technology,
assuming either complementarity or substitutability of immigrant workers with other factors of
production as capital or native workers; (ii) the pure exibility of the labor market.
Borjas (1995, 1999), assuming a perfectly competitive labor market and production comple-
mentarities between immigrant workers and other factors of production, calculates that a stock
of immigrants equal to 12% of the total work force yields a native welfare gain between 0.1%
16
and 0.5% of GDP in the United States. A more sophisticated model of the production theory
is provided in Borjas (2003). Borjas (2003) increases the number of labor aggregates using a
three-level CES technology. The bottom level combines similarly educated workers with dif-
ferent levels of work experience into labor supply for each education group. The second stage
aggregates workers across education groups into the national workforce. Finally, the upper
level combines labor with capital. Estimating elasticities of substitution for each stage of the
CES technology, Borjas (2003) calculates the wage impact of the immigrant inux that entered
the USA between 1980 and 2000. Card (2009) provides a survey of the empirical literature
that measures the inequality of wages among natives and immigrants by estimating the degree
of subtitutability and complementarity of domestic and immigrant workers among high skilled
and low skilled, and within each group.
In absence of technology complementarities among workers, but introducing capital as a
second factor of production, Michael (2003) nds that immigration is welfare detrimental.
Indeed, migrants are net scal beneciaries, namely, they receive more from the host government
than what they pay in taxes. Instead, in presence of international mobile capital, immigrants
make the marginal revenue product of capital increase, causing a capital inow that increases
income for native capitalists and tax receipt, making immigration welfare improving.
We depart from these works along several aspects. We assume a unique factor of production
in both countries, i.e., labor, and moreover, we assume rigid labor markets. Furthermore, our
focus is on the welfare e¤ects of migration when such e¤ects pass through the contribution of
migrants to the production of the public good.
The second assumption that crucially a¤ects the conclusions on migrantse¤ect concerns
the labor market. This may look natural, but a majority of theoretical works so far has
assumed competitive labor markets. An exception is Fuest and Thum (2000). These authors
consider a two-sector, small open economy assuming that wage in one sector is dened by
a wage bargaining between unions and employers. In the other sector, wage is xed at the
marginal product. Then, immigrant workers nd employment in the unionized sector and drive
out some of the native workers. Instead of the high union wage, natives then receive either
unemployment benets or the lower competitive wage of the sector with competitive labor
market. In our paper, we take a more general view on the rigidities of the labor market by
assuming downward and upward rigidities, whatever their source. Furthermore, di¤erently from
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Fuest and Thum (2000), our attention is on the governmentsdecision on public good levels and
corresponding taxes that are a¤ected by the ow of migrants. Finally, a crucial di¤erence with
Fuest and Thum (2000) follows from the way migration is generated in the model. We assume
à la Tiebout that individuals decide where to reside as a consequence of income di¤erences but,
contrary to Tiebout (1956), they are assigned initially to a specic country. This allows us to
derive the consequences of migration both in the receiving and the sending country.
Finally, a large body of literature is now built in public economics to study the e¤ects of
capital mobility. The main reason for capital mobility are di¤erences in capital tax rates, which
have become an important policy instrument for the local and central governments. In fact,
the corresponding literature of the e¤ects of capital mobility is built using a scal competition
framework (for surveys and references see Wilson (1999), Wilson and Wildasin (2004), Wildasin
(2006)). Governments compete to attract capital investments to alleviate unemployment, to
increase employment, or simply to nourish and develop a competitive banking sector. This
scal competition among states or local jurisdictions su¤ers from externalities because the tax
base is mobile. Then, scal competition leads to a race to the bottom of capital taxes that may
determine a suboptimal level of public goods supplied.
We depart from this literature because we neglect competition in income taxes. As a matter
of fact, the percentage of migrants remains still quite low in almost all countries (OECD, 2013),
with the exception of Switzerland or Luxembourg, who importantly depend on cross-border
workers. This could suggest that the decision on income taxes reects more a national policy
rather than the result of a scal competition among nation-states. For this reason, we have
chosen to model income taxes as the residual of the decision of each government on public
investment and not as a consequence of strategic behaviour of governments, as it is depicted
for capital taxation.
6 Conclusion
In the general equilibriummodel dened above, we have explored the welfare e¤ects of migration
when this migration is caused by income di¤erences between the receiving and sending country.
We have fully elucidated the benets and losses between them, as a consequence of resulting
income taxes and wages. We did it for the di¤erent regimes in which the labor market of the
higher wage country stands initially: fully exible wage, excess demand or excess supply of
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labor.
Of course, this elucidation must be taken cautiously. The rst caveat concerns the fact that
the sole engine of migration considered here is the income di¤erence between the countries. In
most real situations, migrations are motivated by several di¤erent incentives, not taken into ac-
count in our analysis. Also we assume that, except for the costs of migration, all individuals are
identical while migration behaviour varies across di¤erent segments of the population (skilled-
unskilled workers, retired-non retired individuals, brain drain, capitalists-workers a.s.o.). Our
model has also strong specicities, like constant returns-to-scale in the production of the public
good, which makes our conclusions more than particular.
The model would certainly be more realistic if mobile capital would also be introduced and
di¤erent types of workers, like skilled and unskilled, would be considered. Such improvements
of the model would permit the analysis of the combined e¤ects on welfare of capital and labor
mobility, like in Michael (2003). It would also allow to consider migrations, in which skilled and
unskilled workers are di¤erentiated. Then the welfare e¤ects of migrations would certainly be
more complex to disentangle, since migrations can then be benecial for the receiving country
relative to one type of workers and detrimental relative to the other.
Nevertheless, our simplied approach gives a rigorous theoretical appraisal to the often
passionate debate about the pro and cons of migration related to income di¤erences among
countries. Introducing more improvements to the model and analyzing how it alter its main
conclusions, would certainly constitute an attractive topic for further research.
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